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A THREAT ASSESSMENT FRAMEWORK FOR LONE-ACTOR
TERRORISTS
Melissa Hamilton*
Abstract
Lone-actor terrorist attacks are on the rise in the Western world in
terms of numbers and severity. Public officials are eager for an evidencebased tool to assess the risk that individuals pose for terroristic
involvement. Yet actuarial models of risk validated for ordinary criminal
violence are unsuitable to terrorism. Lone-actor terrorists vary
dramatically in their socio-psychological profiles and the base rate of
terrorism is too low for actuarial modeling to achieve statistical
significance. This Article proposes a new conceptual model for the
terroristic threat assessment of individuals. Unlike risk assessment that is
founded upon numerical probabilities, this threat assessment considers
possibilistic thinking and considers the often idiosyncratic ideologies and
strategies of lone-actor terrorists.
The conceptual threat assessment model connects three overlapping
foundations: (a) structured professional judgment concerning an
individual’s goals, capabilities, and susceptibility to extremist thought,
plus the imminence of a potential terroristic attack; (b) a multidisciplinary
intelligence team engaging collective imaginaries of an otherwise
unknown future of terrorism events; and (c) coordination between
counterintelligence officials and academic communities to share data and
conduct more research on lone-actor terrorists utilizing a systematic case
study approach and engaging theoretical methodologies to inform about
potential new ideological motivations and terroristic strategies which
may be emerging due to cultural, environmental, and political drivers.
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INTRODUCTION
News headlines, policy center papers, and academic literature have
been expounding upon the benefits generated by the government’s use of
big data to predict the future risk posed by individuals.1 Proponents claim
that risk assessment tools developed on large datasets offer a transparent,
consistent, and logical method of differentiating high risk offenders from
low risk offenders and managing them accordingly.2 But one area of
crime where big data provides virtually no assistance is risk assessment
of the so-called lone actor terrorists.
For the purposes of this Article, terrorism is defined as the unlawful
use of violence to instill fear or to intimidate in furtherance of an
ideological goal.3 Here, lone-actor terrorists refers to those acting outside
of a group’s direct influence.
1. E.g., Andrew Guthrie Ferguson, Big Data and Predictive Reasonable Suspicion, 163 U.
PENN. L. REV. 327, 394 (2015); Julia Angwin et al., Machine Bias, PROPUBLICA (May 23, 2016,
1:45
PM),
https://www.propublica.org/article/machine-bias-risk-assessments-in-criminalsentencing [https://perma.cc/YT92-8TJ3]; Crysta Jentile & Michelle Lawrence, How Government
Use of Big Data can Harm Communities, FORD FOUND.: EQUALS CHANGE BLOG (Aug. 30, 2016),
https://www.fordfoundation.org/ideas/equals-change-blog/posts/how-government-use-of-bigdata-can-harm-communities/ [https://perma.cc/TJM7-GCME]; Sony Kassam, Legality of Using
Predictive Data to Determine Sentences Challenged in Wisconsin Supreme Court Case, A.B.A J.
(June 27, 2016, 1:07 PM), http://www.abajournal.com/news/article/legality_of_using_
predictive_data_to_determine_sentences_challenged_in_wisc [https://perma.cc/3K5D-AKHF].
2. Jordan M. Hyatt et al., Reform in Motion: The Promise and Perils of Incorporating Risk
Assessments and Cost-Benefit Analysis into Pennsylvania Sentencing, 49 DUQ. L. REV. 707, 725
(2011).
3. 28 C.F.R. § 0.85(l) (2017).
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Terrorism is unlike any other crime in that terrorist attacks on lives,
property, and infrastructure have consequences of unparalleled
magnitude. As a result, terrorism takes an extraordinary toll on civil
societies through the heightened level of fear it generates.4 Countries
have responded to a recent uptake in terroristic violence by enhancing
their abilities to detect and capture terrorists or would-be terrorists. This
has resulted in an increase in the number of terrorists processed through
criminal justice systems.5 Hence, officials press for tools that will permit
more accurate assessments to predict which individuals are likely to
engage in future acts of terrorism. Assessments would be useful across
criminal justice decisions, including pretrial detention,6 security
classification,7 sentencing, parole release, supervision conditions upon
release,8 and reintegration plans.9 Government agencies and private
employers may wish to assess potential employees to the extent that
greater consequences may result when terroristic attacks are orchestrated
from inside.10 Risk assessment protocols are therefore of interest to many
constituencies, primarily to law enforcement, national security,
correctional institutions, and other governmental and private agencies.11
Despite the call for a terrorist risk assessment tool, the contemporary
model of risk assessment in the criminal justice system is unhelpful. One
reason behind this is that the relatively small number of terrorist attackers
challenge the statistical strength of any potential model. This also means
that the same array of “big data” that typically informs risk models simply
4. See infra Part II.
5. Hannah Fairfield & Tim Wallace, The Terrorists in U.S. Prisons, N.Y. TIMES
(Apr. 7, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2016/04/07/us/terrorists-in-us-prisons.html
[https://perma.cc/LS6Z-PA37]; Bethany Minelle, Record Number of Terror-Related Arrests, SKY
NEWS (Sept. 14, 2017, 12:10 PM), https://news.sky.com/story/record-number-of-terror-relatedarrests-11034789 [https://perma.cc/LB2Q-SMTZ].
6. John Monahan, The Individual Risk Assessment of Terrorism: Recent Developments, in
THE HANDBOOK OF THE CRIMINOLOGY OF TERRORISM 520, 521 (Gary LaFree & Joshua D. Freilich
eds., 2017).
7. U.N. OFFICE ON DRUGS AND CRIME, HANDBOOK ON THE MANAGEMENT OF VIOLENT
EXTREMIST PRISONERS AND THE PREVENTION OF RADICALIZATION TO VIOLENCE IN PRISONS 61
(2016), https://www.unodc.org/pdf/criminal_justice/Handbook_on_VEPs.pdf [https://perma.cc/
XDD6-Q8GQ].
8. Monica Lloyd & Christopher Dean, The Development of Structured Guidelines for
Assessing Risk in Extremist Offenders, 2 J. THREAT ASSESSMENT & MGMT. 40, 49 (2015),
http://psycnet.apa.org/fulltext/2015-56730-005.pdf [https://perma.cc/ZQD2-S25W].
9. TINKA M. VELDHUIS, REINTEGRATING VIOLENT EXTREMIST OFFENDERS: POLICY
QUESTIONS AND LESSONS LEARNED 7 (2015), https://cchs.gwu.edu/sites/g/files/zaxdzs2371/f/
downloads/VeldhuisPaper-Final%20(2).pdf [https://perma.cc/7YUQ-DKJ8].
10. David BaMaung et al., The Enemy Within? The Connection Between Insider Threat and
Terrorism, 41 STUD. CONFLICT & TERRORISM 133, 134 (2018).
11. D. Elaine Pressman & John Flockton, Calibrating Risk for Violent Political Extremists
and Terrorists: The VERA 2 Structured Assessment, 14 BRIT. J. FORENSIC PRAC. 237, 238 (2012).
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does not exist with respect to terrorism. Plus, empirical research on
terrorists is a relatively nascent academic field, though more studies are
materializing as of late, albeit of varying degrees of quality and scientific
rigor.12
Nonetheless, this situation does not mean that science-informed
practices for the detection and management of terrorists are impossible.
Indeed, counterterrorism work should inherently be an evidence-based
activity.13 The framework and the modeling must simply be reassessed.
The use of the word “simply” here is for colloquial purposes, as the
reformulation of a framework for terrorists requires significant efforts,
innovative methods, and novel theoretical approaches on the parts of
multiple government agencies and disciplinary fields. This Article offers
an integrated platform as a foundation for assessments of the future
dangerousness of individual terrorists. The significance of this Article is
to integrate discrete elements into a broader, more concrete framework;
to articulate how the parts relate to each other; to encourage professionals
with different counterterrorism-related roles to identify and better
understand each other and their skillsets; and to emphasize the
importance of drawing on theoretical and empirical knowledge from
academic research.
Part I of this Article highlights emerging issues with lone-actor
terrorists and why they specifically deserve analytical focus apart from
group-based extremists. Part II briefly reviews the landscape of risk
assessment practices in the criminal justice context and explains why risk
assessment tools designed to address ordinary criminal violence are
unsuitable for evaluating terrorists.
Part III then offers a fresh conceptual framework for assessing
individuals’ potential to carry out lone-actor terroristic attacks. The
framework conceptualizes overlapping agendas. The first agenda depicts
a forensic analysis that forms a threat assessment model. Threat replaces
the notion of risk. Unlike risk assessment, threat assessment does not
operate as a mathematical tool that computes probability estimates.
Instead, the concept of threat assessment accepts that for terrorists,
quantitative judgements are unfeasible, and that the goal is prevention
over predictive precision. In this threat assessment model, the evaluator
focuses on intention, capability, vulnerability to radicalization, and
potential consequences of an attack.
The second agenda bolsters security intelligence with a
multidisciplinary team of behavioural scientists, forensic evaluators,
12. See J. Reid Meloy & Jacqueline Genzman, The Clinical Threat Assessment of the LoneActor Terrorist, 39 PSYCHIATRIC CLINICS N. AM. 649, 650 (2016).
13. José María Blanco & Jéssica Cohen, Evidence-Based Counterterrorism Policy:
Evaluating the ‘Big Picture,’ 13 EUR. POLICE SCI. & RES. BULL. 26, 26 (2015), https://www.cepol.
europa.eu/sites/default/files/science-research-bulletin-13.pdf [https://perma.cc/7J7G-3FBJ].
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intelligence analysts, and law enforcement personnel. Counterterrorism
evaluations of individuals as potential terrorists cannot rely upon standard
investigatory techniques. The unpredictability of terrorists requires a
human imagination, even collective imaginaries, to conjure a
hypothetical future in which a determined ideologue may launch an
extremist attack.
Scientifically-led research forms the third agenda. The focus sketches
a systematic case study of terrorists, their pathways to extremism, and
their trajectories toward carrying out extremist violence. As this
information is often sequestered by governments for security purposes,
requisite confidentiality agreements should be negotiated so that
counterterrorism agencies can provide researchers with sufficient data to
analyze. In addition, intelligence officials should call for more
dynamically-oriented research to inform about potential new forms of
extremist ideologies, lone actor strategies, and modes of attack.
I. LONE-ACTOR TERRORISM
Terrorism is not new.14 Now, though, it is of paramount political and
security concern in Western countries.15 The contemporary threat of
terror has quantitatively and qualitatively metamorphosed.
Quantitatively, the threat of terrorism in the West has increased
exponentially.16 The Global Terrorism Index of 2017 confirms that the
spread of terrorism has expanded over the last decade in Organisation for
Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) countries.17 Many of
the latest terrorist attacks are of higher magnitude.18 From a qualitative
perspective, terrorism is taking an exorbitant toll on feelings of peace and

14. Anthony Fainberg, Terrorist Threats: Technical and Policy Approaches to Countering
Them, 1898 AIP CONF. PROC. 050003, 050003-3 (2017), http://aip.scitation.org/doi/pdf/
10.1063/1.5009232 [https://perma.cc/K7QX-L8RV].
15. Gabe Mythen, Thinking with Ulrich Beck: Security, Terrorism, and Transformation, 21
J. RISK RES. 17, 19 (2017); Yael Litmanovitz et al., What are the Social, Economic, Psychological
and Environmental Risk Factors that Lead to Radicalization and Recruitment to Terrorism?:
A Systematic Review, CAMPBELL COLLABORATION 1 (Sept. 27, 2017), https://www.campbell
collaboration.org/library/download/1003_78895d4f2e0a8caa3046941fc65c9117.html
[https://perma.cc/KEH2-ZQLJ] (opining that terrorism is “[p]erhaps one of the most pressing
issues facing the world today”).
16. Litmanovitz et al., supra note 15.
17. INST. FOR ECON. & PEACE, GLOBAL TERRORISM INDEX 2017: MEASURING AND
UNDERSTANDING THE IMPACT OF TERRORISM 53 (2017), http://visionofhumanity.org/app/
uploads/2017/11/Global-Terrorism-Index-2017.pdf [https://perma.cc/B8HH-MENX].
18. Id. at 54 (reporting a notable increase in the number of attacks and deaths by terrorists
in OECD countries since 2014); Mythen, supra note 15, at 20.
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security for citizens and communities.19 Terroristic attacks, and the threat
of them, have altered social values, changed individual and collective
behaviors, and degraded confidence in governments.20
Violent extremism has disproportionately impacted societal stability
and has driven significant changes in Western nations’ domestic and
foreign policies.21 For instance, countries anguished by terroristic threats
have tended, in the last two decades, to react by bolstering and focusing
homeland and foreign security forces on such threats, even though these
actions strain financial, personnel, and institutional resources.22 The ill
effects of these diversions are then felt across health, social, political, and
economic institutions and structures.23
A. Escalation of Lone-Actor Terrorism
As of late, some of the more significant terrorist groups in the Western
world, Al-Qaeda and the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL), for
instance, have lost much of their power, wealth, and resources such that
there are signs of their decline.24 Yet terrorism remains a priority: The
spectre of lone-actor attacks is alarming security officials across the
West.25 A variety of definitions of lone-actor terrorism abound across the
literature. We need not parse them here. For the purposes of this article,
lone-actor terrorists are reasonably defined as those that operate chiefly
outside of organizational structures, without institutional support and
resources, and independent of larger group dynamics.26

19. Wael Haddara, A Policy-Oriented Framework for Understanding Violent Extremism,
29 NEW ENG. J. PUB. POL’Y 1 (Mar. 20, 2017), https://scholarworks.umb.edu/nejpp/vol29/iss1/4/
[https://perma.cc/RC2J-GZQX].
20. Blanco & Cohen, supra note 13, at 31.
21. Haddara, supra note 19.
22. Orlandrew E. Danzell & Lisandra M. Maisonet Montañez, Understanding the Lone
Wolf Terror Phenomena: Assessing Current Profiles, 8 BEHAV. SCI. TERRORISM & POL.
AGGRESSION 135, 136 (2016); Janice Gross Stein & Ron Levi, The Social Psychology of Denial:
Deterring Terrorism, 47 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 409, 411 (2015).
23. Litmanovitz et al., supra note 15.
24. See Daniel Byman, Explaining Al Qaeda’s Decline, 79 J. POL. 1106, 1107 (2017); Syed
Huzaifah Bin Othman Alkaff & Remy Mahzam, Islamic State after the Fall of Mosul and Raqqa:
Impact on Organisation and Propaganda, 10 COUNTER TERRORIST TRENDS & ANALYSES 57, 57
(2018).
25. Monahan, Recent Developments, supra note 6, at 527; Michele T. Pathé et al.,
Establishing a Joint Agency Response to the Threat of Lone-Actor Grievance-Fueled Violence,
29 J. FORENSIC PSYCHIATRY & PSYCHOL. 37, 39 (2018).
26. KATHLEEN DELOUGHERY ET AL., NAT’L CONSORTIUM FOR THE STUDY OF TERRORISM &
RESPONSES TO TERRORISM, UNDERSTANDING LONE-ACTOR TERRORISM: A COMPARATIVE
ANALYSIS WITH VIOLENT HATE CRIMES AND GROUP-BASED TERRORISM, FINAL REPORT TO THE
RESILIENT SYSTEMS DIVISION, U.S. DEP'T OF HOMELAND SECURITY 3 (2013),
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The growing number and magnitude of attacks by lone-actor extremists
is an important reason for the fresh apprehension amongst security
forces.27 Lone-actor terrorist attacks have been acutely consequential in
recent years in the United States and certain European countries, such as
the United Kingdom and Germany.28 And lone-actor terrorism creates
certain ancillary costs.29 Lone-actor attacks often come without warning
and appear random; they are coined “pop-up terror” as a result.30
Consequently, civilians may feel more vulnerable and less able to defend
themselves from lone actors.31
https://www.start.umd.edu/sites/default/files/publications/local_attachments/START_IUSSD_U
nderstandingLoneactorTerrorism_Sept2013.pdf [https://perma.cc/AJ5J-VJU2].
The threat or use of violence by a single perpetrator (or small cell), not acting
out of purely personal material reasons, with the aim of influencing a wider
audience, and who acts without any direct support in the planning, preparation
and execution of the attack, and whose decision to act is not directed by any
group or other individuals (although possibly inspired by others).
Wes Mountain & Raffaello Pantucci, Comic Explainer: What is Lone-Actor Terrorism?, THE
CONVERSATION (Nov. 28, 2017, 2:09 PM), http://theconversation.com/comic-explainer-what-islone-actor-terrorism-86774 [https://perma.cc/W3UW-7G7R].
While some might describe lone-actor terrorists as those acting entirely independently,
perhaps a better vision understands lone-actors as not exclusively insular in their ideologies,
preparations, and access to instrumentalities of attack. Instead, many lone terrorists at some point
receive indirect assistance from others, wittingly or not, in their preparations. See Danzell &
Montañez, supra note 22, at 139. “[I]t is not always clear that lone actors are truly alone, and
usually investigation uncovers contacts, leakage and evidence of connection with others that casts
doubt on the degree of isolation that can be attributed to an individual.” Raffaello Pantucci et al.,
Royal United Servs. Inst. for Def. & Sec. Studies, Lone-Actor Terrorism: Literature Review,
COUNTERING LONE-ACTOR TERRORISM: LIT. REV. 2015, 1, 1 (Countering Lone-Actor Terrorism
Ser. No. 1, 2015), https://rusi.org/sites/default/files/201512_clat_literature_review_0.pdf
[https://perma.cc/6TAE-2NKD]. There is evidence across countries that at least some lone-actor
attacks may actually be known terrorist groups’ tactical response to governmental security forces
foiling group-based or network-connected terrorist activities with increasing effectiveness. Id. at
3. Thus, terrorist groups appear to be setting up individuals to act without the group’s formal
institutional support, but in furtherance of terrorist group ideologies and aimed at their preferred
targets. Id. This type of scheme now appears to be easily facilitated by the internet and social
media outlets and targeted at individuals interested in self-radicalizing. Id. The point, though, is
that lone actors act relatively autonomously regarding extremist infrastructures.
27. See EUROPOL, CHANGES IN MODUS OPERANDI OF ISLAMIC STATE (IS) REVISITED § 3
(2016), https://www.europol.europa.eu/publications-documents/changes-in-modus-operandi-ofislamic-state-revisited [https://perma.cc/WW8G-TU74]. The Global Terrorism Index of 2017
confirms that lone-actor terrorism increased over the last ten years in Organisation for Economic
Cooperation and Development (OECD) countries. INST. FOR ECON. & PEACE, supra note 17, at 69.
28. Danzell & Montañez, supra note 22, at 135–36.
29. Id. at 136.
30. Roy Williams, Fractured Narratives and Pop-Up Diaspora: Re-Theorizing the
Capillaries of Power, Terror and Intimacy, 8 DYNAMICS ASYMMETRIC CONFLICT 134, 135 (2015).
31. Haddara, supra note 19.
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The European Commission on Terrorism, in reporting a rise in the
number of lone-actor terrorists since 2008, notes that these lone actors
draw on a greater variety of ideologies and appear more unconstrained
than traditional terrorist groups.32 Moreover, the European Union warns
that lone actors who are European citizens cause further damage by
creating social divisions between European communities, instigating a
ripple effect of more extremism in other parts of civil society as a result.33
The spike in lone-actor terrorists is due in part to the increasing ability
to self-radicalize via extremist materials on the internet and digital
technology communications.34 This suggests that lone actors are not
entirely detached from social forces, but that they distinguish themselves
from group-based terrorists in eschewing face-to-face contact in favor of
interactions that can be anonymously plied behind computer or cell phone
screens.
B. Preventing Lone-Actor Attacks
The heightened concern regarding lone-actor terrorist attacks is
justified for additional reasons. The European Counter Terrorism Centre
recently conceded that lone actors are more difficult to thwart, in large
part due to their lack of organizational ties.35 A research report submitted
to the United States Department of Homeland Security references the lack
of usual avenues for detection used by counterterrorism agents.36
Regarding “a lone actor[,] there is no hierarchical organization to disrupt,
no large network to infiltrate, no group literature to monitor, and few
public statements to interpret or background chatter to analyze for
patterns.”37 Lone actors enjoy greater freedom in their activities by being
unrestrained by actions or words which may alienate supporters or trigger

32. Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the
European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions, on Preventing
Radicalisation to Terrorism and Violent Extremism: Strengthening the EU’s Response, at 2, COM
(2013) 941 Final 10 (Jan. 15, 2014) [hereinafter Preventing Radicalisation],
https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/sites/homeaffairs/files/e-library/documents/policies/crisis-andterrorism/radicalisation/docs/communication_on_preventing_radicalisation_and_violence_prom
oting_extremism_201301_en.pdf [https://perma.cc/Q2DT-U3LN].
33. Id.
34. Matthew Feldman, Comparative Lone Wolf Terrorism: Toward a Heuristic Definition,
9 DEMOCRACY & SECURITY 270, 270, 274, 280 (2013).
35. EUROPEAN COUNTER TERRORISM CTR., EUROPOL, LONE ACTOR ATTACKS—RECENT
DEVELOPMENTS
1
(2016),
https://www.europol.europa.eu/sites/default/files/documents/
lone_actor_attacks_-_recent_developments_1.pdf [https://perma.cc/V2W4-8X9H].
36. DELOUGHERY ET AL., supra note 26, at 2.
37. Id.
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governmental crackdowns on a group.38 Also, lone-actor extremists need
not seek advance approval from a collective or its leaders.39 The “solitary
nature of lone wolf terrorism is its most pernicious aspect” in frustrating
early identification.40 This may explain one study’s finding that
counterterrorism forces in the United States took longer to detect loneactor terrorists than group-based terrorists.41 Nonetheless, social isolation
does not render lone actors as one-off threats, especially considering that
lone actor “successes” appear to attract copycats.42
Failure to affiliate with an organization allows lone actors to be more
idiosyncratic in their ideological drivers.43 Lone actors often show great
innovation in tactical strategies:44 Not requiring the approval of others
may offer lone actors the freedom to think outside the box.45 Yet loneactor terrorists are not necessarily more sophisticated than group actors.
Lone actors favor using attack tools that are readily obtained or created,
or that are modified to become instrumentalities of mass death, such as
high-powered firearms, improvised explosive devices,46 and, lately,
vehicles to plow into crowds.47 Lone actors purportedly view their own
actions as constituting “asymmetrical, propagandistic warfare.”48
In sum, the idiosyncratic nature, the seemingly haphazard choice of
targets, and the unpredictability of lone-actor bogeymen differentiate this
type of terrorist.49 These realities only increase the appetite of security
and criminal justice officials for a risk assessment tool that can offer a
systematic and unbiased ability to differentiate individuals who are at
38. Jeffrey D. Simon, Lone Wolf Terrorism: Understanding the Growing Threat, in LONE
ACTORS—AN EMERGING SECURITY THREAT 3, 4 (Aaron Richman & Yair Sharan eds., 2015).
39. Pantucci et al., supra note 26, at 14.
40. DELOUGHERY ET AL., supra note 26, at 2 (citing Peter J. Phillips, Lone Wolf Terrorism,
1 PEACE ECON. PEACE SCI. & PUB. POL’Y 1, 1 (2011)).
41. Brent L. Smith et al., The Emergence of Lone Wolf Terrorism: Patterns of Behavior and
Implications for Intervention, 20 SOC. CRIME L. & DEVIANCE 91, 107 tbl.7 (2015).
42. PAUL GILL, LONE-ACTOR TERRORISTS: A BEHAVIOURAL ANALYSIS 9 (2015).
43. Paul Gill, Bringing Terrorists into Sharper Focus, N.Y. DAILY NEWS (Jan. 18, 2015,
5:00 AM), http://www.nydailynews.com/opinion/paul-gill-bringing-terrorists-sharper-focusarticle-1.2081837 [https://perma.cc/HYK9-FX5T].
44. See id.
45. Pantucci et al., supra note 26, at 1, 14.
46. Gabriel Koehler-Derrick & Daniel James Milton, Choose Your Weapon: The Impact of
Strategic Considerations and Resource Constraints on Terrorist Group Weapon Selection,
TERRORISM & POL. VIOLENCE 4–5, 6 (Mar. 9, 2017), https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/
10.1080/09546553.2017.1293533.
47. See János Besenyö, Low-Cost Attacks, Unnoticeable Plots? Overview on the
Economical Character of Current Terrorism, 62 STRATEGIC IMPACT 83, 84, 93 (2017).
48. Feldman, supra note 34, at 282.
49. See Daniel Peddell et al., Influences and Vulnerabilities in Radicalised Lone-Actor
Terrorists: UK Practitioner Perspectives, 18 INT’L J. POLICE SCI. & MGMT. 63, 65 (2016).
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higher risk of extremist violence and manage that risk to prevent
attacks.50
It is important to note that despite not enjoying the potential
advantages of an existing infrastructure and the resources of organized
terrorist groups, lone actors are not necessarily less dangerous. To
illustrate, a recent study comparing terrorism cases found that, at least in
the United States, lone-actor terrorists were more lethal than group-based
attackers.51 That study’s author suggests that the strength of
counterterrorism infrastructures in the United States may inhibit the
success of group attacks.52 At the same time, lone actors may find solace
in the “country’s history of Right-Wing lone wolf activity, high gun
ownership, and relatively violent culture.”53 Concerning this last
reflection on a violent culture, one may question why statisticallymodelled risk assessment tools for violence, available and used across
criminal justice decision points, are not equally applicable to terroristic
violence. This query is considered next.
II. VIOLENCE RISK ASSESSMENT
The evidence-oriented model for risk assessment utilizes findings
from scientific studies to identify and classify individuals based on the
risk that they will reoffend.54 Evidence-based models for criminal justice
practices are popular—even considered best practices—for predicting an
individual’s likelihood of future dangerousness.55 Informed also by
theoretical approaches, evidence-based practices offer a welcome
displacement of raw human presumptions about an individual’s risk of
criminal offending.56
More specifically, actuarial risk assessment tools are a prominent
fixture in the evidence-based practices movement.57 The “risk” in risk
assessment is meant as a predictive measure for the potential future

50. See Jytte Klausen et al., Toward a Behavioral Model of “Homegrown” Radicalization
Trajectories, 39 STUD. CONFLICT & TERRORISM 67, 67 (2015) (“The rapid rise in domestic violent
extremism has created an urgent need for metrics that can help law enforcement assess the danger
represented by radicalizing individuals.”).
51. Brian J. Phillips, Deadlier in the U.S.? On Lone Wolves, Terrorist Groups, and Attack
Lethality, 29 TERRORISM & POL. VIOLENCE 533, 545 (2017).
52. See id.
53. See id.
54. See Faye S. Taxman, The Partially Clothed Emperor: Evidence-Based Practices, 34 J.
CONTEMP. CRIM. JUST. 97, 97–98 (2018).
55. See Jessica M. Eaglin, Constructing Recidivism Risk, 67 EMORY L.J. 59, 61–62 (2017).
56. See Alfred Blumstein, Some Perspectives on Quantitative Criminology Pre-JQC: and
Then Some, 26 J. QUANTITATIVE CRIMINOLOGY 549, 554 (2010).
57. See Eaglin, supra note 55, at 79.
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outcome of interest.58 In criminal justice, the relevant outcome is
typically related to recidivism; for violent offenders, the goal is often to
predict the likelihood of violent reoffending.59
A. Risk Assessment Models
Two classes of risk assessment models are of interest here. The first
is intrinsically quantitative in nature.60 Actuarial risk methodologies
derive statistical data from the systematic study of historical group
samples.61 The general idea of actuarial risk leads scientific researchers
to run models in order to identify factors which correlate with the future
event at issue.62 Then researchers choose appropriate correlative factors
and assign appropriate weights as some factors achieve greater predictive
ability than others.63 This type of modeling presents as “risk factorology”
in providing a basis for officials to differentiate between individuals at a
higher risk of future dangerousness and those posing a lower risk than
others.64 For criminal justice officials, the risk assessment framework
generally promotes a “future-oriented logic of risk,”65 and embraces a
philosophy of risk aversion.66
Risk assessment tools contain static or dynamic factors, or, more
suitably, a combination thereof. Static risk factors normally are historical,
unchangeable, and generally not amenable to interventions.67 Dynamic
factors reflect criminogenic needs that are mutable in nature and thus
appropriate targets for reducing risk through appropriate interventions.68

58. See id. at 75.
59. See, e.g., Stephen D. Gottfredson & Laura J. Moriarty, Statistical Risk Assessment: Old
Problems and New Applications, 52 CRIME & DELINQ. 178, 182 (2006).
60. See id. at 180.
61. See id. at 181.
62. See Chelsea Barabas et al., Interventions over Predictions: Reframing the Ethical
Debate for Actuarial Risk Assessment, PROC. MACHINE LEARNING RES. (forthcoming),
https://ssrn.com/abstract=3091849 [https://perma.cc/YBK3-XTZR].
63. See JOHN MONAHAN ET AL., RETHINKING RISK ASSESSMENT: THE MACARTHUR STUDY
OF MENTAL DISORDER AND VIOLENCE 142 (2001).
64. See Hazel Kemshall, Crime and Risk, in RISK IN SOCIAL SCIENCE 76, 81–82 (Peter
Taylor-Gooby & Jens O. Zinn eds., 2006).
65. See Mariana Valverde et al., Legal Knowledges of Risk, in LAW AND RISK 86, 116 (Law
Comm’n of Canada ed., 2005).
66. See Min Yang et al., The Efficacy of Violence Prediction: A Meta-Analytic Comparison
of Nine Risk Assessment Tools, 136 PSYCHOL. BULL. 740, 740 (2010).
67. Tracy L. Fass et al., The LSI-R and the COMPAS: Validation Data on Two Risk-Needs
Tools, 35 CRIM. JUST. & BEHAV. 1095, 1096 (2008).
68. Paul Gendreau et al., A Meta-Analysis of the Predictors of Adult Offender Recidivism:
What Works!, 34 CRIMINOLOGY 575, 575 (1996).
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The most popular actuarial risk tool for violence is the Violence Risk
Appraisal Guide (VRAG).69 The VRAG provides a weighted point
scoring system on each of twelve static factors, including criminal
history, age, marital status, history of alcohol problems, and presence of
a personality disorder.70 The assessor scores each factor and then derives
a final sum. The higher the resulting sum, the greater the predicted
likelihood of violent recidivism. For example, the assessor may conclude
that based on the individual’s total score of six, the VRAG would judge
the individual’s likelihood of violent reoffending at forty-four percent.71
An alternative to a pure actuarial model is the structured professional
judgement (SPJ) model consisting of “an analytical method used to
understand and mitigate the risk for interpersonal violence posed by
individual people that is discretionary in essence but relies on evidencebased guidelines to systematize the exercise of discretion.”72 An SPJbased instrument incorporates an actuarial-led factorology, yet also
provides latitude for the evaluator to consider any idiosyncratic factors
that, in her clinical judgement, are risk-relevant to the individual
assessed.73
An example of an SPJ tool may be of interest. A well-known SPJ tool
for violence risk assessment and management is the HCR-20, so named
for the twenty risk factors in the domains of Historical, Clinical, and Risk
Scales.74 The Historical Scale items generally include past antisocial or
violent behavior, the presence of mental or personality disorder, and
certain sociodemographic characteristics.75 The Clinical Scale is meant
to score dynamic factors and includes such items as insight, violent
ideation, signs of instability, and treatment response.76 The Risk
Management scale is also dynamic, though more future-oriented in
69. Jennifer L. Skeem & John Monahan, Current Directions in Violence Risk Assessment,
20 CURRENT DIRECTIONS PSYCHOL. SCI. 38, 39 (2011).
70. See VERNON L. QUINSEY ET AL., VIOLENT OFFENDERS: APPRAISING AND MANAGING RISK
147 (1998).
71. This type of judgement is not empirically accurate as these tools provide group-based
statistics, not individualized predictions. However, it is common practice among forensic
evaluators to conflate the two. See Melissa Hamilton, Adventures in Risk: Predicting Violent and
Sexual Recidivism in Sentencing Law, 47 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1, 44 (2015).
72. Stephen D. Hart et al., The Structured Professional Judgment Approach to Violence
Risk Assessment: Origins, Nature, and Advances, in II THE WILEY HANDBOOK ON THE THEORIES,
ASSESSMENT, TREATMENT OF SEXUAL OFFENDING 643, 643 (Leam A. Craig & Martin
Rettenberger eds., 2016).
73. Anthony Costa Constantinou et al., Risk Assessment and Risk Management of Violent
Reoffending Among Prisoners, 42 EXPERT SYS. APPLICATIONS 7511, 7512 (2015).
74. Kevin S. Douglas et al., Historical-Clinical-Risk Management-20, Version 3 (HCR20V3): Development and Overview, 13 INT’L J. FORENSIC MENTAL HEALTH 93, 98 tbl.1 (2014).
75. Id.
76. Id.
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assessing such things as potential problems with professional services,
living situation, treatment responsiveness, and coping skills.77 HCR-20
requires an ordinal ranking as to each factor in terms of being not present,
possibly or partially present, or present.78 The clinical evaluator is then
given the freedom to consider any additional matter that, in her clinical
analysis, appears relevant to the individual’s risk for violent recidivism.79
In the end, the assessor considers the various ratings across factors and
renders a discretionary judgement as to whether the individual presents a
low, moderate, or high risk of violence.80
Dozens of actuarial tools and SPJ tools for violence risk assessment
are available and in use by various agencies throughout the world,81 with
VRAG and HCR-20 mentioned for illustration purposes. However, for
various real-world and empirical reasons, none of these pre-existing
instruments for assessing violent reoffending are appropriate to assess a
population consisting of terrorists or would-be terrorists.
B. Terrorists as Anomalies
At the outset, it is important to recognize significant distinctions
between ordinary criminal violence—for which various actuarial-based
risk tools (such as VRAG and HCR-20) have shown a generally
acceptable level of predictive validity on certain populations—and
terroristic violence, for which no tool has established sufficient predictive
ability.82 The contention herein is that terrorist attacks do not constitute
ordinary criminal violence. Terrorists are anomalies. The contrasts that
will be cited are, notably, relevant to risk.

77. Id.
78. Diane S. Strub et al., The Validity of Version 3 of the HCR-20 Violence Risk Assessment
Scheme Amongst Offenders and Civil Psychiatric Patients, 13 INT’L J. FORENSIC MENTAL HEALTH
148, 150 (2014). HCR-20 is currently at version 3. Versions 1 and 2 of HCR-20 had assigned 0,
1, or 2 points to each of the twenty items, with higher totals indicating greater risk. Id. Guidance
is provided for rating the presence of each factor in order to provide some structure. Id. The
instrument instructs assessors to additionally consider the relevance of each of the twenty factors
in terms of being of low relevance to violence, moderately relevant, or highly relevant to the
individual assessed. Id.
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. Thomas Douglas et al., Risk Assessment Tools in Criminal Justice and Forensic
Psychiatry: The Need for Better Data, 42 EUR. PSYCHIATRY 134, 134 (2017).
82. Jay P. Singh et al., A Comparative Study of Violence Risk Assessment Tools: A
Systematic Review and Metaregression Analysis of 68 Studies Involving 25,980 Participants, 31
CLINICAL PSYCHOL. REV. 499, 509–10 (2011).
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1. Drivers to Violence
Ordinary criminal violence is typically affective violence in that it is
reactive, defensive, emotional, and/or impulsive; terroristic attacks are
predatory in nature, begetting proactive, instrumental, and targeted acts
of violence.83 Ordinary criminal violence tends to be more temporally
discrete in its reactionary style and situationally limited; terroristic
violence typically requires forethought and planning, and is aimed at
long-term impact projected at a wider audience.84
Unlike ordinary criminals, terrorists often believe their violence is
altruistic in the sense of achieving ideologically-driven ends for a higher
moral cause.85 Conventional criminal sanctions are therefore less likely
to deter terrorists.86 Thus, while individuals who commit ordinary
violence generally attempt to avoid detection, terrorists are attentiongrabbers seeking high-impact consequences from their attacks, which
requires that their actions be shocking and gain public recognition, and
also that the underlying causes be comprehended.87 For these various
reasons, the drivers and motivations behind ordinary violence and
terrorism differ in risk relevant ways that are simply not captured in the
preexisting risk tools for ordinary criminal violence.88
2. Pathways to Terrorism
Certain correlates of terrorism are largely inapplicable to ordinary
criminal violence. Terrorists’ high-impact goals require intangible and
tangible resources that go far beyond motive and intent. Terrorists
typically must navigate two long-term processes, albeit presenting some
overlap, to advance to the stage of executing a terrorist attack. The first

83. J. Reid Meloy, Threat Assessment: Scholars, Operators, Our Past, Our Future, 2 J.
THREAT ASSESSMENT & MGMT. 231, 232 (2015).
84. Meloy & Genzman, supra note 12, at 649.
85. See generally Rick O’Gorman & Andrew Silke, Terrorism as Altruism: An
Evolutionary Model for Understanding Terrorist Psychology, in EVOLUTIONARY PSYCHOLOGY
AND TERRORISM 149 (Max Taylor et al. eds., 2015) (discussing the psychology of terrorism and
especially focusing on altruism).
86. Jennifer Varriale Carson & Brad Bartholomew, Terrorism Outside the Proverbial
Vacuum: Implications for the Moral Context, 37 DEVIANT BEHAV. 557, 557 (2016); see also
Robert A. Fein et al., Threat Assessment: An Approach to Prevent Targeted Violence, NAT’L INST.
JUST.: RES. ACTION, July 1995, at 1, 2, http://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles/threat.pdf (“The threat of
sanctions, such as a long prison sentence, may not deter a person who desperately desires revenge
or is prepared to die to achieve his objective.”).
87. John Monahan, The Individual Risk Assessment of Terrorism, 18 PSYCHOL. PUBLIC
POL’Y & L. 167, 175 (2011).
88. Pressman & Flockton, supra note 11, at 241.
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is a radicalization process for extremist thought.89 The radicalization
process is nonlinear, often involving some combination of push and pull
factors which either draw the individual toward an extremist mindset or
are disinhibiting.90 Research shows that circumstances such as social
isolation, a perception of discrimination, a search for identity, or feelings
of injustice in the world may push an individual toward radicalization.91
Examples of common factors that pull a person into radicalization include
the consumption of extremist material, family or friends who are
members of an extremist group, and desire for status and adventure.92
Push and pull factors go the other direction, too, by disinhibiting the
actual adoption of an extremist mindset or deradicalization after
embracing radical ideologies.93 These are considered protective factors
that reduce the potential of extremist thought.94 Some push factors which
may precipitate disengagement include disillusionment, lost faith in the
ideology, or burnout.95 Protective pull factors, such as desire for an
intimate relationship, a traditional family, or conventional employment,
draw people toward a more mainstream and prosocial life. 96 Hence,
consideration of both risk factors and protective factors that
disincentivize radicalization to an extremist ideology is substantively
essential for terrorism assessments.97
Part of the radicalization trajectory toward endorsing extremist actions
entails developing a mindset in which terroristic activities and the killing
of “innocents” is acceptable and even exalted.98 This often involves

89. See generally Clark McCauley & Sophia Moskalenko, Understanding Political
Radicalization: The Two-Pyramids Model, 72 AM. PSYCHOL. 205, 206 (2017) (discussing
radicalization to extremist opinion and describing an initial step as a “cognitive opening” that
could make one susceptible to new, extremist thoughts and ideals).
90. Randy Borum, Assessing Risk for Terrorism Involvement, 2 J. THREAT ASSESSMENT &
MGMT. 63, 68 (2015).
91. Stijn Sieckelinck et al., Transitional Journeys Into and Out of Extremism: A
Biographical Approach, STUD. CONFLICT & TERRORISM 2 (Dec. 14, 2017),
https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/1057610X.2017.1407075.
92. See id.
93. John Horgan et al., Walking Away: The Disengagement and De-Radicalization of a
Violent Right-Wing Extremist, 9 BEHAV. SCI. TERRORISM & POL. AGGRESSION 63, 63–64 (2017).
94. Paul Gill, Toward a Scientific Approach to Identifying and Understanding Indicators
of Radicalization and Terrorist Intent: Eight Key Problems, 2 J. THREAT ASSESSMENT & MGMT.
187, 188 (2015).
95. Horgan et al., supra note 93.
96. Id. at 94.
97. Borum, supra note 90, at 66.
98. Arie W. Kruglanski et al., To the Fringe and Back: Violent Extremism and the
Psychology of Deviance, 72 AM. PSYCHOL. 217, 222–23 (2017).
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individuals dehumanizing the “others” they blame for their grievances.99
Dehumanization is a cognitive ploy to psychologically and morally
justify using violent methods against beings conceptualized in more
animalistic terms.100
In addition to the radicalization process, the long path toward a
terrorist attack generally requires planning, preparing, and eventually
executing it.101 A study of lone-actor terrorist attacks found that lone
actors committed on average two to three precursor acts, the majority of
which were at least three months preceding the attack; one-third of the
precursor acts occurred more than a year beforehand.102 Researchers
explain that successful terrorist attacks demand capability in that
motivated extremists must attain the opportunity, capacity, and the
tangible means to carry them out.103 Because of the prerequisite of
capability, there is often a learning process whereby would-be terrorists
seek to attain the requisite knowledge and skills in terms of honing their
approaches, strategies, and identification of vulnerable targets in order to
improve their chances of success.104
These dual pathways of radicalization and preparation are rather
unique to terrorism and thus also distinguish terroristic violence from
ordinary criminal violence.105 The radicalization process preceding
violent extremism has no real corollary in other types of violence, which
more often erupt without any antecedent, grievance, or strategy.106
Currently available actuarial tools for violence prediction ignore these
distinctions by failing to address the aforementioned situational and
capacity-oriented characteristics specific to committing terroristic
99. Manuela Caiani, Radical Right-Wing Movements: Who, When, How and Why?,
SOCIOPEDIA.ISA 8 (Jan. 1, 2017), www.sagepub.net/isa/resources/pdf/RadicalRight
Movements.pdf.
100. Id.
101. See generally Lasse Lindekilde et al., Radicalization Patterns and Modes of Attack
Planning and Preparation Among Lone-Actor Terrorists: An Exploratory Analysis, BEHAV. SCI.
TERRORISM & POL. AGGRESSION 8 (Nov. 22, 2017), https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/
full/10.1080/19434472.2017.1407814 (explaining that some of the deadliest lone-acting terrorists
invested considerable time and effort into preparing for their attacks).
102. Smith et al., supra note 41, at 104 tbls.3 & 4.
103. Lindekilde et al., supra note 101.
104. See generally Louise Kettle & Andrew Mumford, Terrorist Learning: A New Analytical
Framework, 40 STUD. CONFLICT & TERRORISM 523, 534 (2017) (concluding that terrorists are
attempting to improve their chance of success through learning processes).
105. See Eric Shuman et al., Explaining Normative Versus Nonnormative Action: The Role
of Implicit Theories, 37 POL. PSYCHOL. 835, 835–36 (2016) (finding dual pathways to be a unique
antecedent of collective action, including radical terrorism).
106. See Alex S. Wilner & Claire-Jehanne Dubouloz, Transformative Radicalization:
Applying Learning Theory to Islamist Radicalization, 34 STUD. CONFLICT & TERRORISM 418, 433
(2011) (explaining that the radicalization process occurs gradually rather than impulsively).
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violence.107 It is not surprising, then, that one study found that many risk
predictors of ordinary criminal violence (including major mental illness,
substance abuse, relationship instability, impulsivity, and lack of insight)
were not relevant for a sample of terrorists.108
3. Terrorism as Low-Likelihood, High-Impact Events
The next critical issue relates to the duality of frequencies and
consequences. Fundamentally, in reference to the frequency of outcomes
observed in a discrete time frame for a specific population, ordinary
criminal violence and lone-actor terrorism have substantially disparate
base rates.109 Ordinary criminal violence is commonplace, whereas loneactor terroristic violence is a relative rarity.110 Notwithstanding, the scale
of the severity of the attack for terroristic violence is inordinately higher
in terms of emotional, economic, and structural consequences to persons,
communities, and nations.111
On the whole, acts of ordinary criminal violence are, comparatively,
high-likelihood, low-impact incidents.112 In stark contrast, terrorist acts
present as low-likelihood, high-impact events.113
The low base rate problem leads to an empirical juggernaut with
respect to crafting a risk assessment tool for individual terrorists. The
sheer infrequency of terroristic attacks explains the near impossibility of
crafting a heavily actuarial tool for individual terrorists that can achieve
the results on predictive validity measures delivered by modern risk
assessment tools for ordinary violence.114 Validity generally refers to how
well a tool measures what it is designed to measure. Accordingly,
predictive validity refers to how well the tool predicts the outcome of
interest in the real world.115
107. Meloy, supra note 83.
108. D. ELAINE PRESSMAN, RISK ASSESSMENT DECISIONS FOR VIOLENT POLITICAL
EXTREMISM 18 tbl.4 (2009).
109. MOLLY AMMAN ET AL, FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, MAKING PREVENTION A
REALITY: IDENTIFYING, ASSESSING, AND MANAGING THE THREAT OF TARGETED ATTACKS
11 (2017), http://nccpsafety.org/assets/files/library/Making_Prevention_A_Reality.pdf
[https://perma.cc/GD8A-NRVD].
110. Paul Gill et al., Indicators of Lone Actor Violent Events: The Problems of Low Base
Rates and Long Observational Periods, 3 J. THREAT ASSESSMENT & MGMT. 165, 165 (2016).
111. Peter Clarke, Investigating Terrorism in the First Decade of the Twenty-First Century:
A Different Sort of Crime, in INVESTIGATING TERRORISM: CURRENT POLITICAL, LEGAL AND
PSYCHOLOGICAL ISSUES 31, 39 (John Pearse ed., 2015).
112. Gill et al., supra note 110.
113. Id.
114. Id. at 187–88.
115. Jay P. Singh, Predictive Validity Performance Indicators in Violence Risk Assessment:
A Methodological Primer, 31 BEHAV. SCI. & L. 8, 8 (2013).
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Risk assessment focuses on predictive ability as the most important
measure of validity.116 Yet meeting the gold standard for empirically
testing predictive validity, a prospective study, is an almost
insurmountable barrier for terrorism risk assessment.117 While this
presents as an empirical matter, the reasons for it are simple and practical.
At least with respect to performing a study to test predictive validity of a
terrorism recidivism risk instrument, the study would entail (1) scoring
the particularly terrorist risk tool on a sample of the population of interest
which includes terrorists and nonterrorists, (2) releasing a large number
of known terrorists into the community for a long follow-up period, (3)
observing which of them committed new acts of terrorism, and (4) testing
how well the tool predicted terroristic recidivism.118 This presents a
methodological feat for which there is likely little political or public
support.119 Besides, because of the low base rate, there is unlikely to be a
sufficiently large, heterogeneous sample of would-be or known terrorists
to study in the first place.
Nevertheless, there is a split in risk aversion strategies between the
scientific and the political. The low base rate for terrorism means that the
safest actuarially-based estimate, in terms of statistically reducing the
likelihood of false positives, would be to predict that each individual will
not commit a terrorist act.120 Yet, such a conservative approach may not
be considered politically appealing considering the high consequence of
catastrophic results if the individual is successful in carrying out a
terroristic attack.121
In light of the foregoing empirical and practical barriers, John
Monahan has suggested that empirical methods may yield a bit—a
postdictive validation on a group of known terrorists might be considered
minimally sufficient.122 This approach would entail studying the presence
of the factors tested on known terrorists and a matched group of nonterrorists and then comparing the results.123 However, such a
116. James Bonta, Offender Risk Assessment: Guidelines for Selection and Use, 29 CRIM.
JUST. & BEHAV. 355, 358 (2002).
117. Mark R. Kebbell & Louise Porter, An Intelligence Assessment Framework for
Identifying Individuals at Risk of Committing Acts of Violent Extremism Against the West, 25
SECURITY J. 212, 224–25 (2012) (entailing “norming a test, item analysis and selection, and testing
validity in an a-priori fashion”). The relevant statistical measures for a prospective analysis are
positive predictive value and negative predictive value. Singh, supra note 115, at 12.
118. Monahan, supra note 87, at 193.
119. Id.
120. Rick Malone, Protective Intelligence: Applying the Intelligence Cycle Model to Threat
Assessment, 2 J. THREAT ASSESSMENT & MGMT. 53, 58 (2015).
121. Id. at 58–59.
122. Monahan, supra note 6, at 528.
123. Monahan, supra note 87, at 194.
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retrospective inspection on an historical sample is a far less accurate
measure of performance.124 Still, a select few terrorism researchers have
crafted potential assessment tools for terrorists along these lines of
postdictive research methods.
4. First Attempts at Terrorism Risk Assessment
Researchers in the last few years have introduced the Violent
Extremism Risk Assessment-2 (VERA-2),125 the Extremist Risk
Guidance (ERG 22+),126 and the Terrorist Radicalization Assessment
Protocol (TRAP-18)127 as SPJ terrorism risk assessment tools for
individuals. It is beyond the scope of this Article to analyze them in great
detail. But for now, it should suffice to respect these as first attempts at
systematic assessment approaches, albeit also acknowledging their
significant limitations. For starters, none of the three tools were
developed as actuarial models based on statistical analyses. Instead, the
instruments were theoretically informed by literature reviews, input from
experts, and selected case histories of convicted terrorists.128 Items
included therein actually do not constitute risk factors in any event.
Fundamentally, risk factors require statistical evidence that they are
correlated to the outcome and precede it in time.129 These developers have
shown evidence of neither. The factors utilized in their instruments are
descriptive, not prescriptive.
Not too surprisingly—considering the base rate problem mentioned
before—there has been no prospective validation of these instruments
and hence no predictive validity test confirmation.130 This void
significantly undermines claims regarding empirical quality. Indeed, all
three have been criticized for lacking transparency in their datasets and
124. Mark. A Ruiz et al., Co-Occurring Mental Health and Substance Use Problems in
Offenders, 24 PSYCHOL. ASSESSMENT 77, 84 (2011). This method is also known as ex-post
forecasting. Jacek A. Kopec et al., Validation of Population-Based Disease Simulation Models,
10 BMC PUB. HEALTH 5 (Nov. 18, 2010), https://bmcpublichealth.biomedcentral.com/
track/pdf/10.1186/1471-2458-10-710 [https://perma.cc/U2XH-KC6X].
125. Pressman & Flockton, supra note 11, at 237.
126. Lloyd & Dean, supra note 8, at 40.
127. Id. at 48, 50; Meloy & Genzman, supra note 12; D. Elaine Pressman, The Complex
Dynamic Causality of Violent Extremism: Applications of the VERA-2 Risk Assessment Method
to CVE Initiatives, in DISASTER FORENSICS: UNDERSTANDING ROOT CAUSE AND COMPLEX
CAUSALITY 249, 251 (Anthony J. Masys ed., 2016).
128. Pressman, supra note 127; Lloyd & Dean, supra note 8, at 48, 50; Meloy & Genzman,
supra note 12.
129. Monahan, supra note 87, at 172.
130. Allard R. Feddes, Risk Assessment in Integral Security Policy, in DE-RADICALISATION:
SCIENTIFIC INSIGHTS FOR POLICY 47, 55 (Lore Colaert ed., 2017). A predictive validation should
include an external validation of the instrument on a different dataset. Kopec et al., supra note
124, at 8.
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methods and for failing to discuss many commonly reported
methodological quality markers, such as predictive validity,
representativeness of sample, and internal consistency.131
Further limitations prevent current tests from reliably predicting
terrorism risks. Each of the tools is plagued by redundancy across
factors.132 More unfortunately, all three contain various predictor factors
that overlap with the dependent variable of terrorism.133 For example,
each includes items regarding ideological motivation.134 Yet ideology is
a critical component that differentiates terrorism from ordinary violence
in the first place.135 For assessment purposes, the problem is that some
type of ideological driver is by definition present in terroristic acts, thus
rendering it tautological. Further, testing for ideological motivation
among terrorists cannot separate the test subjects into high and low-risk
groups, which is a fundamental requirement of risk assessment.136

131. Akimi Scarcella et al., Terrorism, Radicalisation, Extremism, Authoritarianism and
Fundamentalism: A Systematic Review of the Quality and Psychometric Properties of
Assessments, 11 PLOS ONE 15 (Dec. 21, 2016), https://journals.plos.org/plosone/article/
file?id=10.1371/journal.pone.0166947&type=printable [https://perma.cc/E8X8-XT9Q].
132. See Lloyd & Dean, supra note 8, at 46 fig.2 (listing factors of ERG 22+ test that, upon
review, appear redundant, such as: “[n]eed for status” and “[n]eed for dominance,”
“[d]ehumanization of the enemy” and “[a]ttitudes that justify offending,” “[g]roup influence and
control,” and “[a]ccess to networks”); Meloy & Genzman, supra note 127, at 143–44 (listing
factors such as pathological fixation on a cause, framed by an ideology, and identification with a
particular cause); Pressman & Flockton, supra note 11, at 245 tbl.1 (containing several duplicative
factors such as: “[r]ejection of democratic society and values” and “[h]ostility to national
collective identity,” “[d]ehumanization . . . of identified targets of injustice” and “[l]ack of
empathy . . . outside own group,” “expressed intent to act violently” and “[e]xpressed intent
to . . . prepare violent action”).
133. See Lloyd & Dean, supra note 8, at 46 fig.2 (containing several factors necessarily
present in terrorism: “[p]olitical/moral motivation,” “[n]eed to redress injustice and express
grievance,” “[o]ver-identification with a . . . cause,” “[h]armful end objectives,” “[a]ttitudes that
justify offending”); Meloy & Genzman, supra note 127, at 143–44 (2015) (e.g., “[p]redatory
violence,” “[f]ramed by an ideology”); Pressman & Flockton, supra note 11, at 245 tbl.1 (e.g.,
“[c]ommitment to ideology justifying violence,” “[d]riven by moral imperative,” “[i]dentification
of target . . . in response to perceived injustice”).
134. See Lloyd & Dean, supra note 8, at 46 fig.2 (e.g., “[p]olitical/moral motivation”); Meloy
& Genzman, supra note 127, at 143–44 (2015) (e.g., “[f]ramed by an ideology”); Pressman &
Flockton, supra note 11, at 245 tbl.1 (e.g., “[c]ommitment to ideology justifying violence”).
135. See Pressman & Flockton, supra note 11, at 241 (describing terrorism as “[i]deological
violence . . . motivated by commitment to a cause or belief system,” as opposed to “common
violence such as rape, murder, robbery and assault”).
136. Borum, supra note 90, at 65. To be an acceptable predictor, the factor must show some
amount of variation in order to “correctly identify an acceptable proportion of those who go on to
offend (sensitivity) and those who do not go on to offend[] (specificity).” Kiran M. Sarma, Risk
Assessment and the Prevention of Radicalization from Nonviolence into Terrorism, 72 AM.
PSYCHOL. 278, 281 (2017).
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VERA-2 and ERG 22+ were designed to assist correctional officials
in making decisions about “sentencing, rehabilitation, and reintegration
of [terrorist] offenders.”137 Both tests strongly emphasize group-based
Islamist terrorists.138 The generalizability to other types of terrorist
ideologies and to any lone actors is thus dubious at best.139 It is curious
that VERA-2 and ERG 22+ are expressly designed for correctional use
on known terrorists140 as the instruments rely upon factors that
theoretically relate to first-time offending. The developers fortunately do
not purport that their guidelines are relevant to recidivist terrorism.141
This situation further limits the use of these tools as acceptable risk
measures. Previously identified terrorists notably appear to have
relatively small recidivism rates, precluding any presumption that past
terrorist acts are strongly predictive of future terrorist attacks.142 Based
on the evidence of convicted or suspected terrorists released from
custody, Andrew Silke estimates that less than five percent will commit
another violent or nonviolent terroristic act.143
As for the third tool, the TRAP-18 is designed for lone actors, though
it included small cells in the developmental samples and merely measures
the presence of listed behaviors in known terrorists. Therefore, this tool

137. Sarma, supra note 136, at 280.
138. Stephen D. Hart et al., A Concurrent Evaluation of Threat Assessment Tools for the
Individual Assessment of Terrorism 9, 15 (TSAS Working Paper No. 17-1, 2017),
http://www.tsas.ca/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/2017-01-Hart-WP-1.pdf [https://perma.cc/
YL6P-XDZE].
139. Monahan, supra note 87, at 181–82.
140. See Hart et al., supra note 138, at 10, 15.
141. E.g., Pressman, supra note 128, at 259 (“The outcome of assessments for radicalization
to violence is not prediction of recidivism . . . .”).
142. Andrew Silke, Risk Assessment of Terrorist and Extremist Prisoners, in PRISONS,
TERRORISM, AND EXTREMISM: CRITICAL ISSUES IN MANAGEMENT, RADICALISATION AND REFORM
108, 111 (Andrew Silke ed., 2014).
143. See id. Of 453 terrorist prisoners released in Northern Ireland in 1998, over two percent
were recalled after being accused of further involvement in terrorism. Id. at 112. Terrorist reentry
programs in Saudi Arabia, Germany, and Sweden reported terrorism recidivism rates of less than
two, five, and six percent, respectively. Kristen Bell, Looking Outward: Enhancing Australia’s
Deradicalisation and Disengagement Programs, 11 SECURITY CHALLENGES 1, 10 n.64, 11–12
(2015). A German document reports a recidivism rate of approximately three percent for over 500
persons who successfully completed a deradicalization program. EXIT-Germany: We Provide
Ways Out of Extremism, EXIT-DEUTSCHLAND, http://www.exit-deutschland.de/english/ (last
visited Sept. 21, 2018) [https://perma.cc/9LNB-EX5A]. At least one report found a higher
recidivism rate, though it is not based on convicted terrorists. U.S. officials report that as of July
2015, over seventeen percent of detainees released from Guantanamo Bay, Cuba were confirmed
to have reengaged in terrorist activity. DIR. OF NAT’L INTELLIGENCE, SUMMARY OF THE
REENGAGEMENT OF DETAINEES FORMERLY HELD AT GUANTANAMO BAY, CUBA 1 (2017),
http://www.dni.gov/files/documents/GTMO%20Sept_2015.pdf [https://perma.cc/NRY6-XY85].
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is retroactively descriptive rather than predictive.144 The developer
admits that it could best be described as a work in progress.145
In sum, these three instruments are best conceived as developmental
exercises which make some contributions to scientific knowledge about
already identified terrorists. The next Part, though, sketches a conceptual
framework for a threat assessment approach as a more proper alternative
to risk assessment with respect to individual terrorists.
III. EVIDENCE-BASED THREAT ASSESSMENT FOR LONE-ACTOR
TERRORISTS
The previously enumerated issues explaining why common actuarialbased methods for developing risk assessment tools are unsupportable do
not dictate that assessing individuals for the potential of committing
terrorism can never constitute an evidence-based practice. Rather, the
framework itself, along with certain methodologies, must be re-specified,
considering the unique challenges presented by terrorists and terrorism.
The initial recasting in this new framework is replacing the concept of
risk assessment with threat assessment. Overall, the threat assessment
framework for terrorism (a) requires a far more holistic attempt at
gathering a wider variety of data than any single instrument could list, (b)
must draw on, as well as feed, national security intelligence, (c) requires
more intense analytical skill, nuance, and imagination, (d) should
comprise a multidisciplinary team effort charged with detecting and
preventing terrorism, and (e) should draw upon theoretical and empirical
insights from relevant academic fields. A visual rendering of the
framework that will be fleshed out next is provided in Figure 1.
A. Threat versus Risk
Threat assessment concerning terroristic violence diverges
substantively from traditional risk assessment practices for ordinary
criminal violence for important reasons.146 To begin, risk assessment is
inherently quantitative in its expected conclusion concerning an
individual’s probability of reoffending.147 In the U.S. Department of
Homeland Security’s lexicon, for example, risk is defined as the
likelihood of an unwanted outcome, such that risk assessment “assigns
values to risks.”148 The agency views a threat as anything that “indicates
144. See Meloy & Genzman, supra note 127, at 140–41.
145. Id. at 149.
146. See Randy Borum, Operationally Relevant Research and Practice in Terrorism Threat
Assessments, 2 J. THREAT ASSESSMENT & MGMT. 192, 192 (2015).
147. Id. at 192–93.
148. U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., DHS RISK LEXICON: 2010 EDITION 27–28 (2010).
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the potential to harm.”149 Threat assessment is thereby distinct in not
relying upon quantitative values or metrics of prediction. Indeed, with the
low base rate of terroristic attacks, it fundamentally cannot do so.150
There is likewise a differentiation between probabilistic versus
possibilistic thinking. As a general rule, actuarial-based risk assessment
fixates on estimating the statistical probability of an individual engaging
in the outcome of interest.151 Risk assessment, even from a clinical
judgment perspective, is fundamentally about the likelihood of
violence.152 Again, because of the low base rate for terrorism,
probabilistic

149. Id. at 36.
150. Benjamin A. Perman et al., Basic Principles of Threat Assessment, in BIOSECURITY:
UNDERSTANDING, ASSESSING, AND PREVENTING THE THREAT 89, 91 (Ryan Burnette ed., 2013).
151. See Borum, supra note 146, at 192–93; Seth J. Prins & Adam Reich, Can We Avoid
Reductionism in Risk Reduction?, 22 THEORETICAL CRIMINOLOGY 258, 261–62 (2017),
http://journals.sagepub.com/doi/pdf/10.1177/1362480617707948 [https://perma.cc/67SMQFDY].
152. Kevin S. Douglas et al., Violence Risk Assessment: Science and Practice, 4 LEGAL &
CRIMINOLOGICAL PSYCHOL. 149, 153–54 (1999).
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reasoning concerning individual offenders has little to offer terrorism
analysis.153 The reality of this can be illustrated in other ways.
People often make two types of errors when thinking about
probabilities.154 One error is failing to understand that the probability of
an outcome is base rate dependent.155 The accuracy of predicting the
probability of an event that is a common occurrence in the population of
interest will likely be significant. On the other hand, tests that are
otherwise highly accurate cannot predict low base rate outcomes at even
minimally sufficient levels.156 Indeed, the inaccuracy of predictive tools
only increases as the base rate of an event falls below fifty percent.157 The
extreme low base rate of terroristic violence thus renders mathematical,
probabilistic assertions required in risk assessment practices untenable.
The second common error is confounding a conditional probability
with its inverse. This error would equate the probability (p) of A given B
with the probability of B given A as represented in the equation: p (A / B)
= p (B / A).158 As a quick illustration, a finding that most of those who
carried out terrorist attacks in a particular region were Muslim does not
mean that most Muslims in that area will, in the future, commit terrorist
acts. These are not reciprocal probabilities. This raises another caution
about the first structured tools for predicting terroristic actions, including
VERA-2, ERG 22+, and TRAP-18. The existence of descriptive, not
prognostic, factors may confuse assessors into erroneously assuming
those factors are predictive.
In any event, threat assessment is more about possibilistic thinking.159
An evaluator thereby considers the potentiality of a terroristic attack.160
This is consistent with the U.S. Department of Homeland Security’s
formal lexicon defining threat assessment as a “product or process of
identifying or evaluating entities, actions, or occurrences, whether natural
or man-made, that have or indicate the potential to harm life, information,
153. See Jytte Klausen et al., The Terrorist Age-Crime Curve: An Analysis of American
Islamist Terrorist Offenders and Age-Specific Propensity for Participation in Violent and
Nonviolent Incidents, 97 SOC. SCI. Q. 19, 20 (2016).
154. These are corollaries of Bayes Theorem. Richard W. Elwood, Calculating Probability
in Sex Offender Risk Assessment, INT’L J. OFFENDER THERAPY & COMP. CRIMINOLOGY 1262, 1266
(2016).
155. Id.
156. Id.
157. Gottfredson & Moriarty, supra note 59, at 184.
158. Elwood, supra note 154.
159. Frank Furedi, Precautionary Culture and the Rise of Possibilistic Risk Assessment, 2
ERASMUS L. REV. 197, 206 (2009); Gabe Mythen & Sandra Walklate, Counterterrorism and the
Reconstruction of (In)Security: Divisions, Dualisms, Duplicities, 56 BRIT. J. CRIMINOLOGY 1107,
1112 (2016).
160. Marieke de Goede & Beatrice de Graaf, Sentencing Risk: Temporality and Precaution
in Terrorism Trials, 7 INT’L POL. SOC. 313, 317 (2013).
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operations, and/or property.”161 Notice that this definition contains no
probabilistic language like that included in the department’s formulation
of risk assessment.
B. Prediction versus Prevention
The inability to assess statistical probabilities also means that threat
assessment is not reliant upon numerically predictive terms.162 Security
agencies have generally grown to accept this quandary.163 As Britain’s
National Security Council avers, the focus is instead on preventing and
mitigating terrorist threats.164 Indeed, the roots of threat assessment
derive from the United States Secret Service of twenty years ago, with
respect to managing persons who targeted high profile victims, such as
politicians.165 The agency then described threat assessment in terms of its
goal of identifying, assessing, and managing potential perpetrators of
targeted violence.166 A recent FBI statement on prevention of targeted
attacks is consistent therewith:
A threat assessment is not a final product, but the beginning
of the management process. It guides a course of action to
mitigate a threat of potential violence; merely identifying
that someone is of moderate or higher concern, without
developing a management strategy, does not complete this
process and is not recommended.167
Threat assessment is assuredly not as reactive as prevention might
suggest if the context were typical domestic policing in terms of
intervening during the commission of a crime. Threat assessment for
counterterrorism constitutes a more proactive mission of front-end threat
management—ideally long before an individual begins to execute a
terroristic attack.168 Because of the extraordinary impact of terrorist
attacks, threat assessment operates in another dimension in the form of

161. U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., supra note 148, at 37.
162. See Borum, supra note 146, at 192–93.
163. See Council of Europe Convention on the Prevention of Terrorism, May 16, 2005, 2488
U.N.T.S. 129, 134 (showing that European countries are working together to exchange
information to prevent terrorism).
164. NAT’L SEC. COUNCIL, A STRONG BRITAIN IN AN AGE OF UNCERTAINTY: THE NATIONAL
STRATEGY 11 (2010).
165. Brian Vossekuil et al., Threat Assessment: Assessing the Risk of Targeted Violence, 2
J. THREAT ASSESSMENT & MGMT. 243, 243–44 (2015).
166. Fein et al., supra note 86.
167. AMMAN ET AL., supra note 109, at 4.
168. Meloy, supra note 83, at 233.
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“premeditation,” meaning the attempt to mediate an act before it
occurs.169
C. Triplet of Threat Assessment
Threat assessment is a far more robust exercise than risk assessment
for ordinary criminal violence. Threat assessment is not restricted to
simply evaluating whether an individual will attempt to carry out an
attack in a binary manner. Threat assessment aspires to broader ambitions
in determining the nature, imminence, contextual prerequisites,
situational characteristics, and frequency of potential terrorist
outcomes.170
Thus, the Department of Homeland Security refers to threat
assessment for terroristic attacks as involving the triplet of threat,
vulnerability, and consequences, with overlapping interests.171 The
relevant diagram is visually represented in Figure 2.172

Figure 2

169. Thomas Martin, Governing an Unknowable Future: The Politics of Britain’s Prevent
Policy, 7 CRITICAL STUD. TERRORISM 62, 65 (2014).
170. Borum, supra note 146, at 193.
171. See generally U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., supra note 148, at 32 (defining a risk core
as a “numerical representation that gauges the combination of threat, vulnerability, and
consequence at a specific moment”).
172. Terje Aven & Seth Guikema, On the Concept and Definition of Terrorism Risk, 35 RISK
ANALYSIS 2162, 2162 (2015).
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Each of the three domains encompasses multiple dimensions. The
model could well form the basis of a forensic analysis as part of the
overall framework.
The threat segment concerns the intention, that is, goals and motives,
and capabilities of the potential terrorist.173 Terrorists are predatory in
nature, such that their conscious actions preceding a potential attack
provide important data.174 An individual’s intent, for instance, can yield
useful information for prevention purposes regarding the likely choice of
a future target.175 Rather than considering static traits commonly used in
risk assessment models, a threat assessment focuses on analyzing
personal facts.176 Facts here refers to the “individual’s patterns of
thinking and behavior” which indicate whether the person is becoming
radicalized, or if already radicalized, is moving toward carrying out an
attack.177
Recall that one of the differentiating features of terrorism is the
prerequisite of having the capability to carry out a high-consequence
attack.178 An evaluator thus gauges capacity by the extent to which the
individual has attained the requisite knowledge, skills, means,
instrumentalities, and access to an intended target to launch a terrorist
offensive.179 Experts observe that capability also typically requires an
exceptional amount of human energy to prepare and mount a herculean
task and to put oneself in such peril.180 Researchers have suggested
certain behaviors for an assessor to look for in judging whether the
individual’s energy level has risen to the task.181
The interaction between intent and capability is critical. An adversary
is one with the terroristic intent but without the capability to carry out an
attack, whereas a threat has both, which raises the stakes and urgency of
counterterrorist management and prevention.182

173. Melissa R. Haynes & Matthew J. Giblin, Homeland Security Risk and Preparedness in
Police Agencies: The Insignificance of Actual Risk Factors, 17 POLICE Q. 30, 37 (2014).
174. Perman et al., supra note 150, at 89.
175. Aven & Guikema, supra note 172, at 2164.
176. Vossekuil et al., supra note 165, at 249.
177. AMMAN ET AL., supra note 109, at 4.
178. Lindekilde et al., supra note 101, at 8.
179. U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., supra note 148, at 9.
180. Kruglanski et al., supra note 98, at 224.
181. See AMMAN ET AL., supra note 109, at 34 (noting that energy burst warning behavior is
manifested through “an increased pace, duration, or range of any noted activities related to a
potential target”).
182. U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., supra note 148, at 7.
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The vulnerability segment is often considered on a macro level for
counterterrorism purposes.183 For instance, vulnerability considers
redundancy within infrastructures and the resilience of targeted
institutions.184 Still, vulnerability carries additional constructs that are
more relevant to the threat assessment of individuals. These include
factors, such as “us-versus-them” thinking style and the dehumanization
of others, that may increase the person’s susceptibility to ideological
influences and to adopting cognitive and emotional states that make
others acceptable targets of attack.185
Vulnerability also addresses the personal, social, and environmental
situations which may render push and pull factors toward extremism
more enticing to the individual.186 Threat assessment is thereby highly
engaged with the relevance of social, situational, and environmental
characteristics that foster and enable extremism.187 Hence, better threat
assessment methods also consider those protective factors that are threat
reducing.188 Further, vulnerability considers the likelihood of success of
the person’s potential attack.189
To briefly address the third domain, consequences refers to the
possible ramifications of an attack with respect to loss of human life,
economic losses,190 psychological damages,191 physical vulnerability of
structures,192 and the target’s ability to perform a function or meet its
objectives after sustaining an attack.193
The attributes of capability and vulnerability mean that threat
assessment must be operational in terms of gathering information in real
time to mitigate an attack and must be urgently accomplished if the
individual’s attack appears imminent.194 At the same time, threat
assessment is dynamic and contextual in having to keep up and/or
183. Id. at 38 (defining vulnerability in terms of “an entity, asset, system, network, or
geographic area”).
184. Id. at 26. An example of redundancy would be the existence of “additional or alternative
systems, sub-systems, assets, or processes that maintain a degree of overall functionality in case
of loss or failure of another system, sub-system, asset, or processes,” while resilience may regard
the “ability to adapt to changing conditions and prepare for, withstand, and rapidly recover from
disruption.” Id.
185. Sarma, supra note 136, at 280.
186. Borum, supra note 90, at 76, 77.
187. Vossekuil et al., supra note 165, at 249.
188. See AMMAN ET AL., supra note 109, at 29 (explaining that both threat-enhancing and
threat-mitigating factors are identified by experts).
189. Haynes & Giblin, supra note 173, at 33.
190. U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., DHS RISK LEXICON: 2008 EDITION, 14 chart III (2008).
191. U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., supra note 148, at 25.
192. Haynes & Giblin, supra note 173, at 34.
193. U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., supra note 148, at 21.
194. Meloy, supra note 83, at 233.
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reassess as the individual, the situation, and the environmental contexts
evolve and shift.195 Indeed, counterterrorism experts acknowledge that
their laborious efforts may end up for naught.196 Because of the evolving
nature of terrorists as they engage in predatory maneuvering, “it means
that the actual [threat assessment] results may be useless because
terrorism is an ever-changing phenomenon that, by the time we have
analyzed it in one way, has morphed into something else . . . .”197
Notwithstanding these sentiments, an SPJ-light model can have a
significant role in the broader threat assessment scheme that is being
suggested here. As addressed earlier, the model cannot include an
actuarially-based component. Yet, it can have some structure. For
example, a suggested foundation that captures at least some of the essence
of the threat and vulnerability segments of the triplet of threat assessment
theorizes a four-stage analysis of relevant static and dynamic factors: (1)
behavioral history analysis, (2) motivational analysis, (3) vulnerability to
persuasion analysis, and (4) a formulation analysis that hypothesizes
about the relationships between the observations noted in the prior
three.198 The hypotheses in part (4) would best attempt to explain a
potential causal link to terrorist attacks for the individual, in other words,
forming an historical narrative about why the perceived risk factors are
relevant to the threat the individual is judged to pose.199
Some authorities conceptualize threat assessment as a subspecialty of
risk assessment.200 The contention here, however, is that it is preferable
to conceptualize threat assessment as its own genre to avoid confusing
the two. Indeed, the framework for threat assessment for individual
terrorists offered to this point has attempted to substantively distinguish
itself from contemporary risk assessment practices for ordinary criminal
violence. Besides, the next significant addition moves the threat
assessment schema into another knowledge dimension entirely—one
which is clearly particularized to counterterrorism.

195. Malone, supra note 120, at 54.
196. Robert Danisch, Risk Assessment as Rhetorical Practice: The Ironic Mathematics
behind Terrorism, Banking, and Public Policy, 22 PUB. UNDERSTANDING SCI. 236, 241 (2011).
197. Id.
198. See Borum, supra note 90, at 76–78.
199. Sarma, supra note 136, at 284. These factors are premises in which inductive reasoning
is used: if the premises are true there is strong evidence that the conclusion is true. It is noted that
the TRAP-18 tool might in some future form be useful in the first of such a four step process
regarding a behavioural analysis regarding lone-actor terrorists. Though at this point without
further evidence of predictive validity—or at least some proxy for it—some caution in relying
upon it is recommended. Borum, supra note 146, at 194.
200. Meloy & Genzman, supra note 12, at 233 (conceptualizing threat assessment as a
“young tributary from an older and wider river we refer to as violence risk assessment”).
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D. National Security Intelligence
Any forensic assessment model for the potential of terrorist attacks
must merge with security agencies’ intelligence expertise.201 In this way,
knowledge-informed decisions should not rely only upon the professional
judgement (structured or not) of individual assessors in terrorism
assessment cases, no matter how experienced and skilled they may be.
This is because national security intelligence presents its own skillset and
often requires the input of multiple professionals.202 According to the
United States Federal Bureau of Intelligence, national security
intelligence requires “the application of individual and collective
cognitive methods to weigh data and test hypotheses within a
sociocultural context.”203 Further, intelligence analysts have access to
information and data that the forensic assessor will not, usually due to
national security concerns.204
One of the exceptional challenges in preventing terrorism pertains to
the “conundrum of knowing/not knowing” the future.205 This means that
officials try to prevent terrorism before it happens despite being uncertain
about whether the individual actually will commit a criminal act in the
future.206 In a similar vein, national security analysts in the United
Kingdom note that policymakers understand that the job is to take
precautions against future risks that are unknown, imprecise, and
ultimately incalculable.207 The following sentiment sums up the situation
201. See generally Malone, supra note 120 (discussing the application of the intelligence
cycle model to threat assessment).
202. Loch K. Johnson, National Security Intelligence, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF
NATIONAL SECURITY INTELLIGENCE 3, 6 (Loch K. Johnson ed., 2010); Blanco & Cohen, supra
note 13, at 28.
203. Malone, supra note 120, at 54.
204. Blanco & Cohen, supra note 13, at 27.
205. Philip Doty, U.S. Homeland Security and Risk Assessment, 32 GOV’T INFO. Q. 342, 348
(2015) (quoting Claudia Aradau & Rens van Munster, Taming the Future: The dispositive of Risk
in the War on Terror, in RISK AND THE WAR ON TERROR 23, 40 (Louise Amoore & Marieke de
Goede eds., 2008)). The idea of knowns—and more importantly the unknowns—when attempting
to predict rare events has been nicknamed the Black Swan problem: “First, it is an outlier, as it
lies outside the realm of regular expectations, because nothing in the past can convincingly point
to its possibility. Second, it carries an extreme impact (unlike the bird). Third, in spite of its outlier
status, human nature makes us concoct explanations for its occurrence after the fact, making it
explainable and predictable.” NASSIM NICHOLAS TALEB, THE BLACK SWAN: THE IMPACT OF THE
HIGHLY IMPROBABLE xxii (2007) (emphasis omitted).
206. Doty, supra note 205.
207. Anne Hammerstad & Ingrid Boas, National Security Risks? Uncertainty, Austerity and
Other Logics of Risk in the UK Government’s National Security Strategy, 50 COOPERATION &
CONFLICT 475, 476 (2015); see also Kamaldeep Bhui, Flash, the Emperor and Polices Without
Evidence: Counter-Terrorism Measures Destined for Failure and Societally Divisive, 40
BJPSYCH BULL. 82, 82 (2016) (“The immediacy of terrorist threats, often unexpected and in spite
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nicely: “by far the most awesome and fearsome dangers are precisely
those that are impossible, or excruciatingly difficult, to anticipate: the
unpredicted, and in all likelihood unpredictable ones.”208
These challenges again demarcate risk assessment as a far more
knowledge-based exercise, even if that knowledge is incomplete. The risk
assessment structure thus does not apply to future events like terrorist
attacks, which are uncertain and whose quantitative probabilities are
unknown and unknowable.209 This is even truer for the subset of loneactor terrorists, considering their new embodiment of idiosyncratic
trajectories and inventive forms of attacks.210 On the other hand, perhaps
there is a window toward intelligence-based investigation for detecting
lone actors due to their greater tendency toward using social media, which
provides some avenues to detection.211
Nevertheless, any structural form that forensic examiners may engage
will have its limits. Uncertainty means that national security intelligence
requires the input of distinctly human intellect and creativity.212 More
particularly, the exercise in the futurization of terror213 needs an
imagination to be able to identify possible extremists, their
vulnerabilities, emerging instrumentalities, and inventive modes of
attack.214 In sum, counterterrorism intelligence comprises an imaginary
exercise to tame a hypothetical future.215 Far beyond prediction, this
means engaging “cultural fantasies of how risk scenarios may play out,
and the concomitant mobilizations of collective anxieties and political
possibilities in the present.”216 Evaluators here may need to transcend
their own cultural values and norms to be able to conceptualize the
of significant counter-terrorism intelligence and investment, has provoked a crisis in confidence
and strategy, leading to calls for urgent intervention locally and internationally.”); Doty, supra
note 205 (“[T]he aim is to stop terror before it happens in a future that is uncertain, identifying
criminal acts of violence before they are committed even if we must remain uncertain about
whether they would occur.”).
208. ZYGMUNT BAUMAN, LIQUID FEAR 11 (2006) (emphasis in original).
209. Prins & Reich, supra note 151, at 260.
210. Pantucci et al., supra note 26, at 6.
211. Id. at 11.
212. AMMAN ET AL., supra note 109, at 10 (describing how officials were able to tailor
actions in response to actor’s mental disorder); Doty, supra note 205, at 349 (noting that
“algorithmic and computationally intensive methods for decision making” are insufficient to drive
counterterrorism strategies).
213. Doty, supra note 205, at 345.
214. José María Blanco Navaro & Jéssica Cohen Villaverde, The Future of CounterTerrorism in Europe: The Need to be Lost in the Correct Direction, 2 EUR. J. FUTURES RES. 9
(Dec. 5, 2014), https://link.springer.com/content/pdf/10.1007%2Fs40309-014-0050-9.pdf
[https://perma.cc/GF56-G8T2].
215. Doty, supra note 205, at 347.
216. de Goede & de Graff, supra note 160, at 317 (emphasis omitted).
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individual terrorist’s mindset and specific worldview.217 At the very least,
this would entail theoretically accepting the individual’s grievance and
non-normative belief system in order to hypothesize connections to
extremist acts.
Developing national security intelligence is a complicated and
intensive process.218 Unlike the more common risk assessment projects
regarding actuarial and clinical judgements rendered at discrete points in
time, the terrorism threat assessment model envisions an evolving
intelligence cycle, with a continuous feedback loop, and potentially
repeated reassessments.219 All of this means that threat assessment must
draw on cross-disciplinary and professional genres—that is, a
multidisciplinary threat assessment team.220 The team could well include
forensic case examiners, behavioral scientists, intelligence analysts, law
enforcement agents, and, in the context of detained or convicted
terrorists, correctional professionals.221
Despite the value of the imaginary exercises into the unknowable
future, the “knowledge” gained from them and from anecdotal data must
still be tested as it may well be unfounded when subjected to scientific
scrutiny.222
E. Academic Research
There is a final piece to the overall threat assessment framework
developed herein. The role of empirical research has been mentioned
already. But greater emphasis on it requires highlighting and developing
the subject matter even more, considering quality research on individual
terrorists has generally been lacking to date.223
Multidisciplinary threat assessment teams could greatly benefit from
more and stronger input from cross-disciplinary academic study. This
observation is particularly salient in that security experts cite the need for
more vigorous research specifically targeted at lone-actor terrorists.224 An
important reason that lone-actor terrorism research is so far behind is that

217. Ronn Johnson, Forensic Psychological Mindset of a Terrorist: More Questions than
Answers for Public Safety Threat Assessments, 29 SECURITY J. 185, 193 (2016).
218. Johnson, supra note 202, at 4.
219. Malone, supra note 120, at 54.
220. Meloy, supra note 83, at 241.
221. Hart et al., supra note 138, at 6, 11; see also Johnson, supra note 217, at 192.
222. Gary H. McClelland, Use of Signal Detection Theory as a Tool for Enhancing
Performance and Evaluating Tradecraft in Intelligence Analysis, in INTELLIGENCE ANALYSIS:
BEHAVIORAL AND SOCIAL SCIENTIFIC FOUNDATIONS 83, 95–96 (Baruch Fischhoff & Cherie
Chauvin eds., 2011).
223. Bhui, supra note 207.
224. Meloy & Genzman, supra note 12, at 140–41; Peddell et al., supra note 49, at 64.
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sufficient data may not be available for security reasons.225 However, this
may be remedied if counterterrorism forces and academics liaise more
frequently. Security officials have the data; academics have the
methodologies and theoretical approaches.226 An exchange may be in
order. At the same time, too little of intelligence analysis has been
scientifically scrutinized to date.227
Overall, best practices for threat assessment are evidence-based in
terms of drawing on data, knowledge, and theoretical insights from
empirical research. A recent Federal Bureau of Investigation report
affirmatively refers to the value of incorporating published research
alongside practitioner experience into intelligence investigations.228
Two areas of research will be highlighted here. The first regards
empirical study on individuals for terrorism potential. The second
addresses theoretical offerings to inform broader perspectives in
attempting to conceive how lone-actor terrorists will emerge in the future
considering more macro-level, cultural climates.
1. Research on Lone Actors
Research methods on terrorism must be suited to its nature and its
limits. The basis for risk assessment tools for ordinary criminal violence
is properly a nomothetic, population-based approach for research and
analysis.229 As ordinary criminal violence is common, large datasets are
available to mine for correlative factors. This comprises a “many
individuals-many cases” form of analysis.230 In contrast, the extremely
low base rate of terroristic violence and the paucity of known terrorists
available to study means that statistical analyses for terroristic violence
generally cannot follow the same model. The evidence-based model for
threat assessment simply leads to another respecification of the
methodological option.
Empirical studies for terroristic violence can appropriately use an
idiographic, case study approach.231 The case study approach is
eminently appropriate for idiosyncratic lone-actor terrorists as singular
cases.232 Any single case study may provide some insight into at least one
225. Peddell et al., supra note 49, at 64; Meloy & Genzman, supra note 12, at 140–41.
226. Blanco & Cohen, supra note 13, at 27.
227. McClelland, supra note 222, at 96.
228. AMMAN ET AL., supra note 109, at 1.
229. Malone, supra note 120, at 53.
230. Jeryl L. Mumpower & Gary H. McClelland, A Signal Detection Theory Analysis of
Racial and Ethnic Disproportionality in the Referral and Substantiation Processes of the U.S.
Child Welfare Services System, 9 JUDGEMENT & DECISION MAKING 114, 114 (2014).
231. Malone, supra note 120, at 53.
232. Danzell & Montañez, supra note 22, at 145.
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trajectory toward extremism. Without group-based influences necessarily
explaining the radicalization or extremist action pathways for lone actors,
case study research may help contextualize what starts individuals down
those pathways.233 Case studies can also help delineate the various
personality and/or environmental drivers that may be unique to lone
actors.234
The study of human actors who are planning, thinking, and modifying
their behavior based on an intended target’s responses is well suited to a
case study research approach, as the pathway to an attack is not likely to
be a linear one.235 Rather, it may become a cat-and-mouse game between
the threat and his target. Still, while the individual case may have value,
it also has its limits in terms of generalizability. Notably, a
methodological procedure exists in which case studies can be a
disciplined and ordered research regime, the results of which may be
useful beyond the single case.236 This form of study entails the “single
individual-many cases” approach.237
Scholars have sketched out a systematic approach to the case study
method as follows:
[A structured focused comparison model] allows the
researcher to apply structure and focus to the evaluation of
explanatory factors [and] . . . establish validity by conducting
theoretical uniformed inquiries of each explanatory factor.
Simply put, this method is “structured,” in that it allows the
researcher to create general questions that emphasize and
reflect upon a research objective. These questions are asked
of each selected case thus, creating a “systematic
comparison.” Second, the method is focused, in that it only
evaluates certain features within the historical cases. The
benefit of using this method is that it standardizes the
research.238
In short, researchers using this systematic case study approach can
make inferences from patterns observed both within and across cases.239
The systematic case study approach offers the advantage of honing

233.
234.
235.
236.
237.
238.
239.

Id. at 136.
Id.
See Perman et al., supra note 150.
Mumpower & McClelland, supra note 230.
Id.
Danzell & Montañez, supra note 22, at 145 (citations omitted).
Andrew Bennett, Case Study: Methods and Analysis, in 3 INTERNATIONAL
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE SOCIAL & BEHAVIORAL SCIENCES 208, 208 (James D. Wright 2d ed., 2015).
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behavioral science theories about the mindsets of lone-actors.240 The
method is suitable as well for creating theoretical typologies of types of
causal patterns across cases.241 Such an approach may actually be better
suited to accounting for equifinality and complex interaction effects.242
Both are hypothesized as relevant where various terrorist radicalization
pathways exist and experts note the tendency for clustering effects, such
as when certain terrorist behaviors often co-occur.243
Another methodological change that the empirical study of loneactors can beneficially make concerns the unit of analysis. Most research
on terrorism has tended to focus on the group or event levels.244 For the
study of lone-actor terrorists, the more suitable unit of analysis seems to
be the individual terrorist.
In sum, it is important to improve upon knowledge and insight into
individual terrorists, their mindsets, and their trajectories into extremist
violence. Yet this information must be conveyed throughout the
multidisciplinary threat assessment team.245 There are signs that this may
not be happening. For example, a recent study found that intelligence
analysts in England tended not to rely on evidence-based knowledge;
instead the analysts appeared to be drawing on pop-psychology to
conceptualize lone-actor terrorists, their mindsets, and their strategic
choices.246
2. Research to Inform Dynamically Changing Climates
The second area in this research agenda responds to a call for
empirical research at more macro-levels. Critics have decried “the
fetishization of parts” occurring in much of terrorism research, meaning
the “tendency to study terrorism separately from the social movements,
state structures, conflicts, history, contexts, and international
relationships within which it occurs.”247 Hence, potential philosophical

240. Johnson, supra note 217, at 187.
241. Bennett, supra note 239, at 210.
242. Id.
243. John P. Sawyer & Justin Heinz, What Makes Them Do It? Individual-Level Indicators
of Extremist Outcomes, in HANDBOOK CRIMINOLOGY TERRORISM 47, 50 (Gary LaFree & Joshua
D. Freilich eds., 2017).
244. Aaron Safer-Lichtenstein et al., Studying Terrorism Empirically: What We Know About
What We Don’t Know, 33(3) J. CONTEMP. CRIM. JUST. 273, 275 (2017).
245. Meloy, supra note 83, at 241.
246. Peddell et al., supra note 49, at 72.
247. Richard Jackson et al., Critical Terrorism Studies: Framing a New Research Agenda,
in CRITICAL TERRORISM STUDIES: A NEW RESEARCH AGENDA 216, 219 (Richard Jackson et al.
eds., 2009) (citation omitted).
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groundworks could include social movement, social ecology, personality,
social disorganization, and social cognitive theories.248
Similarly, in the future-oriented logic of risk prevention there exists a
significant gap between largely static-oriented academic research and the
more dynamic needs of counterterrorism officials making decisions in
real time and on the ground.249 Thus, counterterrorism officials seek
theoretical foundations for insights into cultural and environmental
changes that may promote new forms of terrorists and modes of attack.250
Consistent with such a call, the European Commission recently
announced funding for research on emerging trends in drivers to
radicalization, and specifically on the motivations posed by the new lone
actor threats.251
In other words, instead of terrorism studies being mostly
retrospectively oriented on historically limited events, researchers could
better aim to assist counterterrorist agencies and the threat assessment
process by offering evidence-based insights into newer pathways to
extremism and terrorist acts. As an example, some researchers are more
timely in exploring how the increase in far-right populism in the United
States and England in the last few years has created an environment of
nationalism, welfare chauvinism, and xenophobia in which right-wing,
lone-actor terrorists are surfacing.252
CONCLUSIONS
Unlike risk assessment of ordinary criminals, analyses of the potential
that individuals will carry out lone-actor terrorist attacks cannot rely upon
big data to feed its information needs. Nonetheless, there is hope that the
threat assessment of lone actors may still have a basis in scientific
research. This Article sets forth an evidence-based framework for the
threat assessment of lone actor terrorists. On the micro-level, it
conceptualizes a multidisciplinary threat assessment team using
structured professional judgment to analyze the individual’s intent,
capability, and vulnerability to extremism, while also considering the
potential consequences of an attack. More and greater efforts on the part
248. Sarma, supra note 136, at 285.
249. Blanco & Cohen, supra note 13, at 27; see also Lindekilde et al., supra note 101
(suggesting research beyond the micro-level to uncover “mechanisms that can link individual
actor characteristics to specific settings and configurations of social relations in fostering the
propensity to consider terrorism as a viable action alternative”).
250. Edwin Bakker, Forecasting Terrorism: The Need for a More Systematic Approach, 5 J.
STRATEGIC SECURITY 69, 77–78 (2012).
251. Preventing Radicalisation, supra note 32.
252. See generally THOMAS GREVEN, RIGHT-WING POPULISM AND AUTHORITARIAN
NATIONALISM IN THE U.S. AND EUROPE (2017) (explaining how right-wing populists and
authoritarian nationalists have capitalized on the failure to socially regulate economic
globalization and cultural change); Feldman, supra note 34, at 272, 281.
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of empirical researchers to study lone actors may, in the future, form the
basis of structured judgment tools.
Intelligence experts must also engage in an imaginary exercise of
foreseeing the future—considering lone actors are highly
unpredictable—in a relative vacuum of solid knowledge of all relevant
facts and circumstances. The framework considers macro-level
theoretical research informing counterterrorism forces of the cultural,
environmental, and situational drivers that may spawn new forms of
terrorists and modes of attack. The evidence-based practice set forth
conceives of the need for intelligence communities and empirical
researchers to substantially improve their cooperation. Academics need
relevant data that intelligence agencies harbor, and agencies seek
theoretical and knowledge-based insights from researchers. Urgency in
addressing these considerations is clear as even newer forms of lone-actor
attacks are likely on the horizon.
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